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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY M. HORMAN and 
THEODORE HORMAN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-V-
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, and GALAXY OUTDOOR 
ADVERTISING, INC., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 
10933 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants initiated suit against respondent, Liquor 
Control Commission of Utah, wherein appellants sought 
to obtain an appropriate writ requiring and ordering 
respondent Liquor Control Commission of Utah to re-
voke a regulation of respondent Liquor Control Commis-
sion of Utah which authorizes the advertising of light 
beer on billboards. This regulation is known and identi-
fied as Regulation No. 4. 
I 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Subsequent to the filing of appellants' complaint, 
respondent Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., sought and 
obtained leave to intervene as a party defendant. There-
after, respondent Liquor Control Commission of Utah 
filed a motion for judgment on the pleading which was 
denied by the lower court and answers were thereupon 
filed by both respondents. 
Appellants moved for summary judgment and at the 
hearing of appellants' motion for summary judgment, 
respondents orally moved for summary judgment. Re-
spondents' oral motion for summary judgment was made 
without objection by appellants. The lower court denied 
appellants' motion for summary judgment and granted 
respondents' motion for summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents submit that the granting of respond- . 
ents' motion for summary judgment should be affirmed. i 
! 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pursuant to the authority vested in respondent I 
Liquor Control Commission of Utah, hereinafter referred I 
to a:s the "commission," by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann .. 
M 1 00 
§ 32-1-7 ( 1966) the commission, on or about l1 arc 1 ~·1 · 
1966, promulga~ed a regulation known and identified as 
Regulation No. 4, wherein it was provided: 
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A. Alcoholic beverages, excluding light beer 
shall not be advertised in anv manner which 
is contrary to section 32-7-27, Utah Code Anno-
tatd 1953. 
B. Light beer may be advertised in any reason-
abl manner consistent with the public interest 
subject to the following conditions: ' 
( 1) The approval of the commission must first be 
obtained for every form of advertising display 
or method which utilizes family pets, family 
scenes, drinking scenes or which the advertiser 
has reason to believe Yrnuld be deemed contrary 
to the public interest by the commission. In such 
an event, the advertiser 'Shall submit to the com-
mission a speciment [sic] of the proposed or dis-
approve the same. If approved, no published 
advertisement shall contain any statement of 
approval by the commission. 
( 2) The commission will not approve any adver-
tising proposal, sign, display, system or method 
which alludes to minors, or which is inconsistent 
with good taste or public morals. 
(3) On order of the commission any sign, dis-
play or advertisement which the commission shall 
consider objectionable or contrary to the public 
intereist, shall be removed. 
Prior to the promulgation of Regulation No. 4, the 
commission operated under the following regulation: 
All advertising of alcoholic beverages, including 
light beer, on billboards,. sign b.oard~, road s~gns, 
painted bulletins, electric or ~llummate~ :sign~, 
or on or in any form of exterior advert1smg is 
hereby prohibited except as provided in 32-7-27 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and in these regula-
3 
tio1!-s· The tenn 'exterior advertising' is construed 
t? mclude an~ advertising, displayed or set out-
side the prenuses or at any place within upo 
tt h d . . , nor a ac e to t_he pre1mses if the same is visible 
from the outside, and the regulations herein prom-
ulgated are intended to cover all such advertising. 
The issues presented by the instant case are whether 
the appellants have standing to challenge the validity 
of Regulation No. 4, and, in the event the first issue 
is resolved in favor of appellants, whether Regulation 
No. 4 is a valid exercise of the statutory authority con-
ferred on the commission by the Utah State Legislature. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELILANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE 
REGULATION PRO~IULGATED BY THE 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
AUTHORIZING THE ADVERTISING OF 
LIGHT BEER ON BILLBOARDS PURSU-
ANT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS. 
Respondent submits that Regulation No. 4 is a valid 
exercise of the discretion vested in the commission by 
the Utah State Legislature. However, before the validity 
of the authority of the commission to promulgate such 
a regulation may be considered, it is jurisdictionally 
mandatory that consideration be given to the standing of 
appellants to challenge the action of the commission. 
A basic tenet in American jurisprudential procedure 
is that before a party may challenge the actions of an 
4 
administrative agency, that party must be vested with 
"standing to sue." As stated in 2 Am. Jur. 2d Admini-
strntive Law ~ 575, at 393 (1962) : 
One o~ t~e ~octrines or standards which operates 
as ~ 1Im1ta~101~ ~1pon ~he availability of judicial 
review or Judicial relief against administrative 
action is 'standing to sue.' 
It is further stated at 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative 
Law ~ 575, at 395 (1962) : 
A complainant's interest must be some special 
and peculiar personal interest directly and ma-
terially affected by the alleged unlawful action, 
and an interest which is not different in legal 
character from that of citizens and taxpayers in 
general may be held insufficient. 'Where a par-
ticular objectionable feature does not operate to 
the prejudice of the complainant he may be held 
to be without interest to raise a question as to 
such matter. 
This doctrine is further illustrated by Stark v. Wick-
ard, 321 U.S. 288 (1943), .. wherein the United States Su-
preme Court considered the actions of the Secretary of 
Agriculture in establishing minimum prices for classes 
of milk with an additional requirement that a milk hand-
ler in a designated area could not pay less than the 
minimum prices to the producers. In discussing the issue 
of "standing to sue," the Court held at 321 U.S. 304: 
It is only when a complainant possesses some-
thing more than a general int~re~t in the. ~roper 
execution of the law that he 1s m a pos1t10n to 
secure judicial intervention. His interest m~st 
rise to the dignity of an interest personal to 111m 
and not possessed by the people generally. 
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The elements of standing to sue are as established , 
th · · a~ e prmc1ple. As stated by the Supreme Court of Cali. 
fornia in Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Ross, 390 P.2d 
193, 196 (Cal. 1964) : 
.... ~hos~ requirements are ( 1) a clear and present 
mu;nstenal duty of the defendant to do an act 
wh1c~ the law_ spec~fically enjoins and (2) a sub-
stantial beneficial mterest of the plantiff in the 
performance of that duty .... 
This court has also considered the elements of stand-
ing to sue and in Bishop v. Moorehouse, 38 Utah 234, 112 
Pac. 169 (1910), it was held at 38 Utah 237: 
Then our inquiry must be ( 1) whether the plain-
tiff is clearly entitled to what he demands; and 
(2) whether it is clearly the duty of the defend-
ants to act .... 
The position announced by this court in Bishop v. 
Moorehouse, supra, and adhered to in Snyder v. Emer-
son~ 19 Utah 319, 57 Pac. 300 (1899); Woodcock v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Salt Lake City, 55 Utah 458, 187 Pac. 181, 
10 A.L.R. 181 (1920); Towler v. Warenski, 59Utah171, 
202 Pac. 37 4 ( 1921) ; is the view taken by the majority of 
the courts. Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores 
Ass'n v. Kerng.ood, 189 A. 209 (Md. 1937); Grey v. Jet1r 
kins, 183 Kan. 251, 326 P.2d 319 (1958). 
Examples of a proper determination that the plain· 
tiff entertained a peculiar interest in the actions of the 
administrative agency and was therefore vested with 
standing to sue are: United States v. Storer Broadcast· 
6 
... 
i11g Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), wherein it was held that 
the regulations of the Federal Communications Com-
mission operated to control the business affairs of the 
plaintiff and unless plaintiff was allowed to obtain a 
modification of the administrative policy, enlargement 
of plaintiff's standard of FM stations could not be ob-
tained; Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 
341 U.S. 123 ( 1951), wherein the plaintiff was allowed to 
bring an action for removal of the plaintiff's name from 
the United States Attorney General's list of subversive 
or communist organizations; Columbia Broadcasting 
System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), wherein 
it was determined that irreparable injury to plaintiff's 
business would occur if plaintiff was not allowed to 
challenge the validity of the Federal Communications 
Commission regulation. 
In all instances, the administrative action was con-
sidered to produce an adverse or prejudicial affect on 
the aggrieved party before that party was determined to 
be vested with standing to sue. It is obvious that no 
such affect may be alleged or claimed by appellants in 
the instant case. 
Respondent submits, therefore, that appellants have 
no standing to challenge the validity of Regulation No. 4. 
Appellants have not and may not allege a unique or 
peculiar interest in the validity of Regulation No. 4, nor 
may appellants allege a unique or peculiar damage 
through the promulgation of Regulation No. 4. 
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POINT II 
THE ISSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATE 
WRIT IN THE NATURE OF A WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS AS SOUGHT BY APPEL-
LANTS IS NOT JUSTIFIED OR PROPER 
UNDER ·THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
Appellants seek to secure the issuance of an "appro-
priate writ" in the nature of a writ of mandamus whereby 
respondent commission would be compelled to revoke 
Regulation NO·. 4. However, several factors negate the 
propriety of the issuance of such a writ in the instant 
case. 
In Cope v. Toronto, 8 Utah 2d 255, 332 P.2d 977 
(1958), this court held that Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(3) 
is merely a restatement of the established and recog-
nized definitions of the purpose of a writ of mandamus 
and that the rule is to be confined to its literal meaning. 
The philosophy and policies announced by this court 
prior to the adoption of Utah R. Civ. P. would properly 
apply to matters in the nature of mandamus proceedings 
arising since the adoption of Utah R. Civ. P. 
Respondent commission submits that the promulga-
tion of a regulation such as Regulation No. 4 is a matter 
of sound administrative discretion. It is well established 
that the element of discretion, as applied to the actions 
and policies of an administrative agency, negates the 
applicability of a mandamus proceeding to control '.he 
actions and policies established by an administrative 
agency. Tuttle v. Bd. of Ediic. of Salt Lake City, 77 Utah 
270, 294 Pac. 294 ( 1930). 
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This court has also adopted the position that unless 
the act sought to be compelled through mandamus is 
clear and one which the law especially enjoins as a duty, 
the relief must be denied. Mammoth City v. Snow, 69 
Utah 204, 253 Pac. 680 (192G); Bishop v. illoorehouse, 
supra. In the instant case, no clear statutory duty justi-
fies the issuance of a writ of mandate against the com-
mission. Rather, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 
( 1966), by the plain and clear meaning of the language 
of that section permits such advertising. 
Appellants refer to a "specific duty" on the part 
of the commission to prohibit billboard advertising of 
light beer. However, in Startup v. Hannon, 59 Utah 329, 
203 Pac. 637 (1921), this court stated, 59 Utah at 332: 
The language of the statute quoted near the be-
ginning of our statement of the case is plain, un-
equivocal and unambiguous. It needs no interpre-
tation to determi1u' the fact that a mandatory 
didy is imposed upon the county oommissioners 
to provide such funds as may be reasonably nec-
essary to carry out the purposes of the law in 
accordance ·with its express terms and provisions. 
This being the case, it is a positive duty of the 
commissioners to provide the funds without equiv-
ocation or evasion. [Emphasis added.] 
Also, in Crockett v. Bd. of Editc. of Carbon County 
School Dist., 58 Utah 303, 199 Pac. 158 (1921), and 
Archer v. State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d 
622 (1964), a clear statutory obligation and duty was 
imposed on the defendants. In each case cited by appel-
lants, the statute was clear and unequivocal. However, 
9 
in the instant case, respondent submits that (1) Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), does not specific-
ally prohibit the type of controlled advertising of light 
beer on billboards permitted by Regulation No. 4, and 
(2) Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), by the 
plain and clear meaning of the language of that section 
' permits such advertising. 
In considering both the standing of appellants to 
challenge the validity of Regulation No. 4 and also the 
propriety of the relief sought by appellants, it is neces-
sary to note that appellants' authorities do not support 
their contentions. For example, appellants' reference 
to 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administr,ative Law§ 575, at 395 (1962), 
completely ignores the fact that the section specifically 
provides that individual rights must depend on the per-
formance of a duty. 
Also, appellants fail to recognize the proposition 
contained in 35 Am. Jur. Mandamus § 320, at 74 (1941), 
wherein it is stated: 
But acts of public officers which could not injure 
the petitioner in any way will not furnish him 
ground for complaint. 
In summary, respondent submits that appellants' 
application for mandamus is without support because 
of the absence of any adverse affect on appellants 
through the promulgation of Regulation No. 4, and be-
cause of the lack of any clear, specific statutory duty 
on the commission to refrain from the promulgation of 
such a regulation. 
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POINT III 
THE UTAH STATE SUPREME COURT IN 
BIRD & JEX CO. V. FUNK, 9G UTAH 450, 885 
P.2D 831 (1939), DID NOT DISPOSE OF THE 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL. 
A. THE CASE OF BIRD & JEX CO. V. 
FUNK, SUPRA, DOES NOT SUPPORT 
APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS. 
B. THE FACTS INVOLVED IN BIRD 
& JEX CO. V. FUNK, SUPRA, ARE DIA-
METRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE 
FACTS PRESENTED IN THE IN-
STANT CASE. 
C. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT 
THE CASE OF BIRD & JEX CO. V. 
FUNK, SUPRA, MAY BE INTERPRET-
ED AS ALLEGED BY APPELLANTS 
AND THAT THE CASE DOES SUP-
PORT APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS, 
THE CASE SHOULD BE OVERRULED 
BY THIS COURT. 
A. THE CASE OF BIRD & JEX CO. V. FUNK, 
SUPRA, DOES NOT SUPPORT APPELLANTS' CON-
'l'ENTIONS. 
A brief recitation of the facts involved in Bird & 
Jex Co. v. Fmik, supra, would serve to isolate the issues 
of that case and reveal the actual position taken by this 
court. The case involved an action to restrain the en-
forcement of regulations of the commission that pro-
hibited the advertisement of light beer on billboards. 
The plaintiff alleged that the last provision of Utah 
Laws 1935, ch. 43, ~ 140, at 76, which is identical to the 
11 
last proviso contained in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
~ 32-7-27 (1966), compelled the commis:sion to authorize 
the advertisement of light beer on billboards. The plain-
tiff contended that, because of the last proviso of the 
applicable statute, the commission could not prohibit 
the advertisement of light beer on billboards, but could 
only promulgate regulation authorizing such advertising. 
The defendant commission filed a general demurrer 
which was sustained by the lower court. This court 
stated at 85 P.2d 834: 
The only question to be determined at the moment 
is: Granting the constitutionality of the Liquor 
Control Act, and particularly sections 7 and 140 
(quoted above), docs the Liquor Control Com-
mission have the power to prohibit billboard ad-
vertising in the face of the last proviso in Section 
140. [Emphasis added.] 
This court concluded that, notwithstanding the last 
proviso of the applicable statute, the commi:ssion could 
prohibit the advertisement of light beer on billboards and 
was not bound to promulgate merely permissive regula-
tions. 
Respondent submits that if the question involved in 
the instant case was the same as that involved in Bird 
& Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, i.e., if the commission had not 
revoked the prior regulation and appellants were now 
seeking to compel the commission to authorize the adver-
tising of light beer on billboards, the case of Bird & !ex 
Co. v. Funk, supra, would be applicable and controlhn~. 
However, in the instant case, appellants seek to restr~in 
the commission from exercising that which the conunis-
12 
sion submits to be the discretionary authority vested in 
the commision by the Utah State Legislature. The case 
of Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, does not stand for 
the proposition that the commission cannot exercise ad-
ministrative discretion and permit the advertising of 
light beer of billboards pursuant to the regulations of the 
commission. Rather, this court merely upheld the exer-
cise of administrative discretion by the commission to 
totally prohibit such advertising notwithstanding the last 
proviso of the applicable statute. 
A basic distinction must be made between the duty 
of the commission to authorize such advertising as con-
sidered in Bird & Jex Co. v. Fitnk, supra, and the dis-
cretionary power of the commission to permit such adver-
tising. Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, holds that the 
commission is under no duty to permit such advertising, 
but does not hold that the commission is without discre-
tionay authority to permit such advertising. 
In Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, the court was con-
cerned with a definition of the duties and powers of the 
commission and thus concluded that, unless an area had 
been specifically excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
commission by the Utah State Legislature, the commis-
sion was vested with complete power and control to 
manage the liquor monopoly on behalf of the State. This 
aspect of complete control supports the conclusion that 
the commission is vested with a wide latitude of discre-
tionary powers as against specifically imposed duties. 
This court further stated at 85 P.2d 836: 
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B:u~e. (m) of_ the Commis~ion is in effect a pro. 
h1b:hon of hillhoard nnd G'gn udvc•rtising of alco-
holic beverages, inclndino· li o·ht beer. The r 1
01 . . b b v ll-m1ss10~ . wm~ld have. no right to prohibit such 
adverhsm~ if by ~eg1slative act such advertising 
were permitted. Such, however, is not the case 
and ~u_le ( m) is bif:t a re-assertion of the specifi~ 
P'.o~ision of Sectwn 140 irhich effectively pro-
hibits such advertising. [Emphasis added.] 
Respondent submits that the Liquor Control Act 
does not, in and of itself, permit the advertising of light 
beer on billboards. Rather, the Liquor Control Act vests 
in the commission the discretionary power to either pro-
hibit such advertising or permit such advertising pur-
suant to the regulations of the commission. 
Again, the distinction must be drawn between the 
duty of the commission and the vested power of the 
commission. If the Liquor Control Act specifically per-
mitted such advertisement, the commission, of course, , 
could not prohibit the advertisement. It would then be 
the duty of the commission to permit such advertisement 
in the first instance and act merely as a regulatory 
body. A conclusion that the commission is not duty bound 
to permit the advertisement of light beer on billboards 
does not necessitate or justify a conclusion that the 
commission is without power to permit such advertise-
ment pursuant to its regulations. 
This interpretation is further supported by the state· 
ment of the court at 85 P.2d 836: 
It is contended that the use of the word 'shall' 
indicates an intent of the legislature that adver· 
14 
tising of light beer is authorized by the act. In 
view of the evident purposes of the act and the 
wording of the other parts of section 140 we 
are of the view that the word 'shall' should be 
construed as merely permissive. [Emphasis add-
ed.] 
Respondent agrees that the last proviso of the stat-
ute should be construed as permissive. This obviously 
vests in the commission the discretionary power to elect 
to prohibit the advertisement of light beer on billboards 
or permit the advertisement of light beer on billboards. 
In other words, the advertising of light beer on billboards 
shall be permitted once the commission exercises its 
discretionary power to authorize such advertisement. 
Once this discretion is exercised, the advertisement 
is subject to such regulation as the commission may 
make. Therefore, the Liquor Control Act alone does not 
permit the advertisement of light beer on billboards, but 
vests the choice of prohibition or permission in the com-
m1ss10n. 
Appellants submit that the following statement by the 
court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, supports their 
position that the issues presented by the instant case 
were decided by the case. The court stated at 85 P.2d 837: 
Holding as we do, that billboard and other out-
door display advertising is prohibited by the Act, 
the appellants are in no position to question the 
validity of the other regulations adopted. by the 
Commission, and for that reason we refram from 
passing on them. 
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Respondent submits that Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 32-7-27 (1966), which is identical to the statutory provi-
sions considered by the court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Fitnk 
supra, sets forth the general prohibition against adver'. 
tisement of alcoholic beverages under certain specified 
conditions. However, respondent also submits that the 
advertisement of light beer on billboards may be per-
mitted by the commission pursuant to the statutory au-
thority contained in the last proviso of Repl. Vol. Utah I 
I 
Code Ann. § 32-7 -27 ( 1966). The "holding" submitted i 
by appellants to support their position must be inter- · 
preted to be that because the Liquor Control Act gen-
erally prohibited the advertising of light beer on bill- I 
boards, and, because the regulation of the commission 
1 
was but a mere reassertion of this general prohibition, : 
it necessarily followed that the commission was under no • 
duty to allow such advertising. The regulation consid- · 
ered in Bird & Jex Co. v. F'imk, sitpra, being a mere 
reassertion of the general prohibition contained in the 
Liquor Control Act, was held to be a valid exercise of 
the discretionary power of the commission. The holding 
of the Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, would be that the 
commission was not duty bound to permit the advertising 
of light beer on billboards notwithstanding the last pro· I 
I 
viso of Utah Laws 1935, ch. 43, § 140 at 76. 
B. THE FACTS INVOLVED IN THE CASE OF 
BIRD & JEX CO. V. FUNK, SUPRA, ARE DIAMET-
RICALLY OPPOSED TO THE FACTS PRESENTED 
IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
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As noted above, in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, 
the court was asked to determine whether the commission 
was bound to authorize the advertising of light beer 
on billboards notwithstanding the last proviso of Utah 
Laws 1935, ch. 43, § 140, at 76. The court concluded that 
no such duty existed on the part of the commission. 
However, this conclusion is of no help in determining 
whether the commission has the discretionary power to 
permit such advertising. 
Therefore, based on the distinctionable facts of the 
instant case and Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, it may 
not be said that a precedent exists in support of appel-
lant's contentions. 
C. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE CASE 
OF BIRD & JEX CO. V. FUNK, SUPRA, MAY BE 
INTERPRETED AS ALLEGED BY APPELLANTS 
AND THAT THE CASE DOES SUPPORT APPEL-
LANTS' CONTENTIONS, THE CASE SHOULD BE 
OVERRULED BY THIS COURT. 
Respondent immediately concedes that the statute 
considered by the court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, 
is identical with Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 
(1966), which is the basic statute involved in the instant 
case. However, respondent respectfully sumits that the 
court, in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, misconstrued 
that statute to arrive at a result whereby the commission 
would not be duty bound to permit the advertisement of 
light beer on billboards. In considering the predecessor 
to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 32-7-27 (1966), the court 
stated at 85 P.2d 835: 
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Section 140 may be divided into four parts t, 
h.b. . ' \\0 pro _i _ itions ~n~. two pr~visos as follows: (1) A 
specific_ prohibition agamst billboard signs and 
other displays; (2) A general prohibition of all 
other advertising and all 'means of inducing per. . 
sons to buy alcoholic beverages, or to enter places ' 
w_here alc?h?lic be:erages are sold;' ( 3) A pro. 
viso perm1ttmg a sign on the window or front of 
authorized premises and limiting it to a simple 
designation of the fact that beer or other beverage 
is sold or manufactured; and ( 4) the proviso 'that 
advertising of light beer shall be permitted under , 
such regulation as the commission may make.' 
The court then concluded that the second proviso 
was an exception carved out of the general prohibition 
against all other forms of advertising but that the pro-
viso did not affect the specific prohibition against bill-
board signs and other displays. Both the specific and 
general prohibition referred to by the court in Bird & 
Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, are found in the second sentence 
of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 32-7-27 (1966), wherein 
it is stated: 
This provision shall be construed to prohibit ~he 
use of anv electric or illuminated signs, contnv· 
ance or d~vice, signboard, billboard, or other di~­
play signs, and to prohibit the display of alcoholic 
beverages or price lists in windows or show cases 
visible to passersby, and to prohibit the use of a~Y 
other means of inducing persons to buy alcoholic 
beverages, or to enter places where alcoholic bev· 
erages are sold .... 
Respondent submits that the construction placed ~n i 
Utah Laws 1935, ch. 43, § 140, at 76, by the court in 
Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, obviously violates the 
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plain and clear wording and intent of the statute. Re-
spondent contends that the second sentence of the statute 
should be considered as instructional with the legislature 
specifically directing the manner in which the entire 
provision is to be interpreted. This instructionary sen-
tence should not be considered a general and specific 
prohibition in itself, but rather, merely a declaration of 
legislative intent as to the proper manner of construction 
to be given the provision. 
Respondent's interpretation is exemplified by an 
examination of the terminology and grammatical struc-
ture employed in the second sentence. For example, the 
sentence specifically states "this provision shall be con-
strued." This obviously is a specific directive by the 
legislature as to the correct manner of interpretation to 
be given in the entire provision. Also, the use of the 
conjunctive "and" indicates that the prohibition aga,nst 
advertising would include not only the forms of adver-
tising specifically enumerated, but also, "any other means 
of inducing persons to buy alcoholic beverages." 
Respondent submits that a proper construction of 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966) would be as 
follows: The first sentence of Repl. Vol. U tab Code Ann. 
~ 32-7-27 (1966), wherein it is stated, "the prohibition 
against advertising alcoholic beverages and against win-
dow displays in liquor stores of the commission shall 
apply in like manner to all manufacturers and licensees of 
alcoholic beverages, and to packaged agencies ... " refers 
to the prohibition against advertisement of alcoholic bev-
erages by the commission contained in Repl. Vol. Utah 
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Code. ~~11. ~ 32-7-26 (1966), and is intended to apply that 
proh1b1hon to all manufacturers and licensees of alcoholic 
beverages. The second sentence of Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann.~ 32-7-27 (1966), is a directive indicating the legis-
lative intent as to the proper manner of construction of 
the entire provision. The prohibition against advertising 
would apply not only to the manners of advertising 
specifically enumerated in the second sentence, but also 
to ". . . any other means of inducing persons to buy 
alcoholic beverages." The third sentence provides one 
execption to the general prohibition against advertising 
of alcoholic beverages in that, " ... the fact that beer, 
wine, or other liquors are manufactured or sold under 
authority derived from the commission may be placed 
in or upon the window or front of the place of business 
having such authority." The fourth sentence should be 
construed as a proviso authorizing a further exception 
to the general prohibition against advertisement of alco-
holic beverages in that it is specifically provided, " .. · 
that advertising of light beer shall be permitted under 
such regulation as the commission may make." 
The last proviso, or the fourth sentence of Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), should be given the 
effect of removing light beer from the general prohibi-
tion against the advertising of alcoholic beverages. 
Reference to the Liquor Control Act supports the 
interpretation submitted by respondent. For example, 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 32-1-3 (1966) provides: 
d · this The following words and phrases use 1Il 
act shall have the following meaning, unless a 
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different meaning clearly appears from the con-
text: 
'Alcoholic beverage' means and includes 'beer' 
and 'liquor' as they are defined herein .... 
The general prohibition contained in Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann. § 32-7-27 ( 1966), against the advertisement 
of alcoholic beverages would include, ordinarily, light 
beer. However, by virtue of the last proviso of Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), it clearly appears 
that light beer is to be excluded from the general defini-
tion of alcoholic beverages. Therefore, the context of 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 ( 1966), by specific 
references, excludes light beer from the general defini-
tion of alcoholic beverages and the general prohibition 
against advertising applicable to alcoholic beverages. 
The statutory construction suggested by respondent 
also construes the phrase "shall be permitted"' of the last 
proviso of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), 
as vesting a permissive discretionary power in the com-
mission. This permissive construction was conceded by 
this court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra. 
Another aspect of the interpretation submitted by 
the respondent is that the interpretation gives a logical 
construction to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 
(1966). The construction placed on Utah Laws 1935, 
ch. 43, § 140, at 76, in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, 
completely eliminated the effect intended by the legis-
lature when the last proviso of Utah Laws 1935, ch. 43, 
~ 140, at 76, was included, or tacked on to the statutory 
provision. 
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The logical conclusion of the interpretation of Bird 
& Jev Co. v. Fitnk, sitpra, urged by appellant is that, in 
dealing with light beer, the commission may only promul-
gate regulations prohibiting that which the statute has 
already prohibited. This interpretation completely ig-
nores the plain and clear meaning of the grammatical 
construction and terminology employed by the legislature 
in drafting Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 32-7-27 (1966). 
It does not logically follow that the Utah State Legis-
lature, by including the last proviso of Repl. Vol. utah 
Code Ann. § 32-7-27 ( 1966), intended the commission to 
be vested only with power to prohibit that which the 
legislature had already prohibited. 
Respondent, therefore, respectfully submits that the 
construction of Utah Laws 1935, ch. 43, § 140, at 76, 
adopted by this court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supro, 
should be overruled and the construction submitted by 
respondent adopted in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that appellants are not vested 
with standing to challenge the validity of Regulation No. 
4. Also, the relief sought by appellants is improper in 
that the basic prerequisities to the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus are not present in the instant case. 
The promulgation of Regulation No. 4 is a proper 
exercise of the discretionary power vested in the cow· 
mission by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (19661; 
. f · 1 b f appellants Appellants' contentions must ai ecause o 
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sole reliance on Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, which 
is misinterpreted by appellants, inapplicable to the facts 
of the instant case and a misconstruction of the statute 
ronsidered in the case. 
The granting of respondents motion for summary 
judgment by the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Assistant Attorn0y General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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